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ABSTRACT: In this commentary, we examine Schaefer’s proposal to apply a 
hierarchical predictive processing (HPP) framework to research on music perception 
and music performance. As we shall see, this proposal raises the possibility of 
enriching this research area with new theoretical and empirical resources from further 
afield. In order to tap the potential of such a project, it will be important to work 
towards the formulation of hypotheses that are uniquely generated by the HPP 
framework. We attempt to contribute to this project by specifying explanatory 
resources within the HPP framework that are well-suited to formulating such 
hypotheses, by articulating several novel questions that are generated by the attempt to 
apply the HPP framework to musical perception and performance, and by identifying 
potential challenges for such a project to address. We also provide reasons to expect 
that the HPP framework may be especially fruitful in the context of joint (musical) 
action.  
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IN an upcoming article in this special issue, Schaefer (2014) demonstrates how a hierarchical predictive 
processing (HPP) framework can be drawn upon to create an illuminating new perspective upon music 
perception and music performance. Such a perspective makes it possible to give fresh answers to old 
questions, to establish novel connections among apparently disparate themes and research areas, and to 
raise stimulating new questions for further research. Moreover, as Schaefer emphasizes, the framework is 
also appealing for broad theoretical reasons – in particular, it is well-positioned to integrate core insights 
animating embodied cognition approaches (such as the interconnectedness of cognition, action and 
perception), while at the same time retaining a focus on the internal models that enable music listeners and 
performers to anticipate and to synchronize with musical patterns, and to coordinate with others in 
producing music. In this brief commentary, we will home in on a few of the central themes of Schaefer’s 
article, and attempt to identify several ways in which those themes may fruitfully be articulated further. 
Let’s begin by recalling the basic outline of Schaefer’s approach. 
 
MUSIC IN THE PREDICTIVE BRAIN 
 
At the core of the HPP framework is the idea of a hierarchy of models (for comprehensive accounts, see 
Hohwy 2013; Clark 2013; Friston 2012. Lower-level models predict changes in sensory input at short 
timescales, while higher-level models predict changes occurring over longer timescales, namely by 
representing more abstract causes of the changes in sensory input. Models at hierarchically different levels 
constrain each other through the dynamics of prediction error minimization: each model generates 
predictions about the representations at the immediately subordinate level; these predictions are compared 
with the actual state of the subordinate-level model; a prediction error is returned to the superordinate-level 
model; the superordinate-level model is then revised to generate a new prediction. By this process, the 
interconnected models are continuously updated and prediction errors minimized.  
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 In the context of music, such a hierarchy of models makes it possible to predict musical events at 
multiple timescales, from predictions of events occurring over shorter timescales (such as what the next 
tone will be) to slower changes at hierarchically superordinate levels (such as chord progressions and 
upcoming resolutions). Even higher up the hierarchy, there may also be beliefs about, for example, the 
performer’s or the composer’s intentions, or the social context of the music. An important question to ask, 
moving forward, is what specific hypotheses are generated by this conception of a vertical hierarchy of 
models, organized around timescales and degrees of abstraction. Psychologists interested in music 
perception have been alert to the importance of anticipation for many years (Keller, Novembre & Hove 
2014), so the emphasis on prediction (i.e. anticipation) is not itself new. In order to generate truly novel 
hypotheses, it seems most promising to examine the specific dynamics of prediction error minimization 
across the vertical hierarchy, i.e. the interplay of predictions generated at different levels of the cortical 
hierarchy. How might it be possible, for example, to modulate music listeners’ expectations about events 
occurring over shorter timescales by manipulating their background beliefs about the music? In other areas 
of cognitive science, such as in research on visual perception, HPP has been used to generate novel 
questions and hypotheses, and to formulate specific quantitative models. It may be fruitful to see how this 
has been done in those contexts, and to look for analogous phenomena in the context of music perception or 
performance. In one pioneering study, for example, Hohwy and colleagues (2008) were able to use HPP to 
formulate highly specific predictions about top-down effects upon the temporal pattern of changes in visual 
perception within a binocular rivalry paradigm. Might it be possible to create effects akin to binocular 
rivalry in the context of music perception – for example by creating stimulus configurations that can be 
heard as manifesting two separate rhythms, but not both at the same time? For example, in a stream 
segregation paradigm, participants might hear a target rhythm in one segregated stream or a different 
rhythm if they hear the two streams as unsegregated (Bregman, 1994). If this could be done in a way that 
leads listeners to switch periodically between hearing the two rhythms, then it would be interesting to 
investigate whether manipulating their high-level expectations (for example by manipulating their 
background beliefs or by instructing them beforehand to move their bodies with one of the rhythms) may 
influence the pattern of shifts in their perception of the rhythm.  
 Ongoing work by Wolf, Vesper, Knoblich, and Sebanz (2014) on the top-down influence of 
beliefs upon music perception and performance in a joint action paradigm may provide a starting point for 
further research along these lines. In this study, novices performed very simple piano duets in dyads. For 
half of the duets, participants were informed that the two parts had been composed with the intention to be 
performed as duets, whereas for the other half of the duets, they were informed that the two parts had not 
been composed with this intention. In addition, Wolf and colleagues manipulated the harmonic relation 
between the two parts (same key or different keys). The main finding was that the differences in synchrony 
between the same key and the different key parts were significantly greater when participants believed the 
melodies had been intended to be played together, attesting that the participants' beliefs had led to an 
increase of joint action representations. 
 
PREFERENCES AND PREDICTABILITY 
 
One important use to which Schaefer wants to put this hierarchical apparatus is in accounting for individual 
differences in music perception, in particular individual differences in preferences. It is clear enough that 
people would come to have different models based upon their different music experiences, and that this 
would lead them to have different expectations, but we do not find it obvious how this would lead to 
differences in preference. In order to explain how differences in preference arise, it appears necessary to 
introduce further explanatory resources. It would be clear, for example, that different predictive models 
lead to different preferences if it were the case that people have a preference for what is expected. But is 
this the case? Too much predictability can of course also be boring. One possible solution, then, is that 
there is a sweet spot of predictability, such that each person tends to prefer music that is just predictable 
enough to engage with their models, but not so predictable as to be boring – much as Goldilocks always 
opts for the middle ground between the hard bed and the soft bed, between the hot porridge and the cold 
porridge. Huron (2006), for example, has developed an account of emotional valence in musical perception 
based upon this idea. As he puts it: “Expectations that prove to be correct represent successful mental 
functioning. Successful predictions are rewarded by the brain” (p. 361); and, on the other hand: “Although 
expected events are generally preferred, highly predictable environments can lead to reduced attention and 
lowered arousal – often leading to sleepiness” (p. 362) More generally, accounts of aesthetic experience 
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have also been developed based upon this idea, which is often referred to under the label of “processing 
fluency” (Reber, Schwarz and Winkielman, 2004; Berlyne 1971).  
 But this idea does not seem plausible. First, the amount of predictability that people prefer seems 
to be among the things that differ from one person to the next: some like repetitive music in the style of 
Philip Glass, while some prefer free jazz (Rentfrow & Gosling, 2003; Francès, 1976; Kammann, 1966; 
Barron, 1955). Moreover, even if there were a sweet spot for predictability, we do not think that identifying 
that sweet spot could be sufficient to account for preferences. This is because there are qualitative 
differences among the (tonal) events that are being predicted in the first place. Highly unpleasant sounds, 
such as those produced by a novice trumpet player, may not be very congenial even if they have the “right” 
degree of predictability. Thus, we suspect that the notion of a sweet spot of predictability may in fact 
merely create the impression of an explanation without actually delivering one (we might dub this the 
“Goldilocks fallacy”). In sum, we think that one important challenge moving forward will be to give a 
detailed account of how different predictive models lead to different preferences. 
 
EMBODYING MUSIC 
 
A further attractive feature of the HPP framework, as Schaefer emphasizes, is that it is well-positioned to 
capture and do justice to the insights of embodied cognition approaches without embracing the skepticism 
about representations and internal models which such approaches have sometimes led to, and thus without 
sacrificing the explanatory power of such internal models (De Bruin & Michael, forthcoming; Geeves, 
McIlwain, Sutton & Christensen, 2013; Michael, Christensen & Overgaard, 2014). This is because, like 
embodied cognition approaches, HPP places an emphasis on the integration of cognition with both 
perception and action.  With respect to perception, it denies that there is any clear divide between 
perception and cognition. Instead, according to HPP, there is a graded hierarchy of models functioning 
according to the same basic principles but differing with respect to the timescale at which they generate 
predictions of changes in the world. With respect to action, as Schaefer also points out, the HPP framework 
in fact identifies a sense in which action can be equivalent to the updating of higher-level cognitive models, 
namely through active inference. The idea is as follows. When confronted with a prediction error, the brain 
has two options. The first option is to revise its model of the world until the prediction error is satisfactorily 
diminished. The second option is to change the world so that it matches the model. In the context of music 
performance, for example, one may expect to hear the sounds one is producing on a piano at a particular 
tempo; if this expectation is not met, one can revise one’s expectations or one can actively change the 
tempo. In the terms of HPP, this would amount to changing the world to match the model one had of it.  
 In future research, it will be interesting to investigate whether this novel view of how action 
relates to perception and cognition leads to new questions and to novel and testable hypotheses. The notion 
of active inference may, for example, create a fresh perspective upon the phenomenon of rhythmic 
synchronization, i.e. on people’s tendency to synchronize their bodily movements involuntarily with 
perceived rhythmic tones or light emissions (see Repp 2005). One might, for example, conceptualize this 
tendency as a response to the prediction errors that are generated as the brain perceives (and attempts to 
model and predict) rhythmic tones. In other words, perhaps the brain engages in active inference and 
expects thereby to influence the perceived rhythm and to make it conform to the model. This would only be 
the case if the brain had a prior expectation that bodily movement is likely to influence perceived rhythms, 
or that perceived rhythms are coupled to moving bodies – perhaps because this was the case in many 
contexts evolutionarily. This raises questions about the kinds of rhythmic tones or light emissions the brain 
might have  modeled and or influenced through bodily movements in what evolutionary contexts. Although 
speculations of this nature about evolutionary history are notoriously difficult to evaluate, this line of 
thought does illustrate the kind of conjecture that the notion of active inference can inspire. Alternatively, 
one might cast the same conjecture in ontogenetic terms: perhaps the brain expects to be able to influence 
the rhythm of perceived auditory or visual stimuli because it often can during the course of development. 
This is not altogether unlikely, given the importance of contingent and rhythmic social interaction in early 
childhood (Gergely & Watson, 1999). This line of thought leads to the prediction that people might have a 
bias toward expecting that their own rhythmic movements will influence the rhythm of perceived tones or 
light emissions. 
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PLAYING AND LISTENING TOGETHER: JOINT ACTION IN MUSIC 
 
One further area in which the integration of action with perception and cognition may be especially fruitful 
is the context of joint musical action. When the perspective is expanded from individual agents listening to 
or performing music to multiple agents doing so together, several important new factors come into the 
picture. First of all, each agent’s performance of or response to the music can influence the other agents’ 
performance and response. Thus, there is a straightforward application for the notion of active inference. 
Second, the reciprocal influence among the different agents also occurs at the level of the models they 
employ to predict what is coming next in the music. This is because each agent is not only modeling the 
music but is also modeling the other agent’s actions and intentions, as well as the other agent’s model of 
her actions and intentions. As Hohwy and Palmer (2014; see also Friston & Frith, in press) have pointed 
out, this kind of recursive higher-order modeling is characteristic of human social interaction, and generates 
new, characteristically social challenges for the brain engaged in prediction error minimization. For 
example, it casts joint musical performance in the form of a coordination problem. In coordination 
problems, such as the stag hunt game (Skyrms, 2004), two agents each maximize their individual benefits if 
they coordinate their actions but get no benefit if they try to coordinate but fail to do so, and are therefore 
tempted to opt for a smaller benefit which does not depend upon coordinating with the other agent. In the 
context of music, two jazz performers might both prefer, having just finished what appeared to be the final 
verse of a jazz standard, to start up again for a surprising additional repetition of the chorus – but only if the 
other does so as well. In this case, the structure of a coordination problem is implemented, since the agents’ 
interests converge, but there is also a second acceptable option (remaining silent), which entails less risk. 
Each agent has to assess what the other agent is likely to expect her to do, what that other agent is likely to 
expect her to expect the other agent to, etc. In order to avoid being paralyzed by the ensuing regress, it is 
important to identify the level of certainty that is acceptable, and that is likely to be acceptable to the 
performer as well. 
 More generally speaking, the expansion to the context of joint music perception and performance 
also raises the possibility of exploring new links between music perception and performance, on the one 
hand, and research on social cognition and social interaction on the other. There is a wealth of ongoing 
research, for example, on the (conscious or unconscious) signaling that occurs within joint action: in some 
cases, agents reduce the variability of their movements in order to render them more easily predictable for 
their partners; in other cases, they exaggerate certain movements in order to make them more easily 
interpretable (Vesper, Butterfill, Sebanz & Knoblich, 2010;  Vesper, van der Wel, Knoblich & Sebanz, 
2013; Pezzulo and Dindo 2011). One highly valuable benefit of investigating music perception and 
performance in joint actions is that it is possible to draw upon this rich background of research on joint 
action in order to motivate specific hypotheses prior to conducting research, and thus to constrain and 
structure theorizing in advance. By the same token, researchers working in the field of joint action should 
be delighted to explore a relatively fresh domain in which existing hypotheses can be tested, and potentially 
corroborated, in novel contexts. 
 
FURTHER DIRECTIONS 
 
In sum, Schaefer offers a commendably clear and balanced presentation of how the HPP framework may 
fruitfully be applied in research on music perception and performance, and in doing so raises the possibility 
of enriching this research area with new theoretical and empirical resources from further afield. In order to 
exploit the potential benefits of this enrichment, it will be important to work towards the specification of 
hypotheses that are uniquely generated by the HPP framework. If this can be achieved, and if some or 
many of those hypotheses are borne out, it would not only be a boon to research on music perception and 
performance, but potentially also to research on joint action more generally, and may help to provide 
further empirical support to the broader HPP framework. 
 
NOTES 
 
[1] Correspondence can be addressed to: Dr. John Michael, Department of Cognitive Science, Central 
European University, Frankel Leo Ut 30-34, 1023 Budapest, Hungary, michaelj@ceu.hu 
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